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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIpN 
The Decree of Divorce forming the basis for this appeal 
was entered May 12, 1987, in the Sixth Judicial District Court 
of the State of Utah and constitutes a final judgment as that 
term is defined in Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
A Notice of Appeal meeting the requirements of Rule 3 of 
the Rules of Court of Appeals was timely filed within the time 
allowed by Rule 4, and all the required fees have been paid. 
Jurisdiction is conferred under the provisions of Section 
78-2(a)-3(g) and Section 30-3-7 Utah Code Annotated (1953 as 
amended). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Donald Lloyd Jefferies is the father of Joycelyn 
Jefferies, ag& 37. Eva Louise Jefferies is her mother. Mr. 
Jefferies files this appeal seeking review of the child support 
provisions of a Decree of Divorce which dissolved the marriage 
between the parties to this action and awarded a contract 
receivable to the child. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following issues are presented for review: 
1. Does the trial court have jurisdiction to remove 
ownership of a marital asset from litigating parties in a 
divorce proceeding and award it to a child of the marriage? 
2. Was the criteria set forth in the Uniform Civil 
Liability for Support Act Section 78-45-7 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended) properly applied by the trial court in 
determining and awarding child support for Joycelyn Jefferies, 
an adult daughter of the litigating parties? 
DETERMIN1T1VE STATUTES 
Page 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7 8,9,10,11, 
14 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a final judgment and Decree of Divorce 
entered in the Sixth Judicial District Court for Sanpete 
County, State of Utah by the Honorable Don V. Tibbs on May 12, 
1987. Particularly, this appeal questions the property 
distribution and child support provisions of said Decree and 
particularly the removal by the Court from the marital assets 
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of a balance owing to the parties under a Real Estate Sale 
Contract and giving it to an adult daughter whom the Court 
found to be incompetent to care for herself. 
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL 
The case was tried to the Court on April 23, 1987, Mrs. 
Jefferies presented evidence that the child was incompetent and 
argued that certain of the parties accumulated assets should be 
distributed to that daughter, (Transcript, P.59). Mr. Jefferies 
is before this Court questioning the jurisdiction of the Court 
to do that. He is not challenging his responsibilities to 
support the child if the trial court's determination that she 
is incompetent is upheld. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 16, 1943, Donald L. Jefferies and Eva Louise 
Jefferies were married. (T.4). During the 44 years of marriage 
(T.4), the Jefferies had as issue to the marriage four 
children, Bill, Wesley, Mariane, and Joy. (T.58-59). 
The youngest of the four children, Joy, is emotionally and 
academically slow in that she functions on approximately a 
third grade level. (T.59). 
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At the time the Court below entered the Decree of Divorce, 
Joycelyn Jefferies was 37 years of age. 
Several years prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, 
Donald and Eva Jefferies operated an antique store in 
partnership with Tom and Sue Sego. (T.7-8). Prior to the filing 
for divorce, the Plaintiff Eva Jefferies would go to the 
antique shop to find Don Jefferies and Sue Sego inside the 
antique shop with the door locked and refused to open the shop 
until they were ready. (T.63). On occasion, Don Jefferies and 
Sue Sego would take off together in the afternoons and just 
close-up the antique shop. (T.63-64). When Plaintiff confronted 
Don Jefferies prior to the time he left, Don indicated that the 
relationship with Sue Sego had been going on for two years. 
(T.64). Although Plaintiff and Defendant had been married for 
some 44 years, the Defendant's leaving which culminated in a 
Decree of Divorce was not the first time in which Don Jefferies 
had left his wife, Eva Jefferies, and family. Twelve years 
prior to these precedings, the Defendant Don Jefferies left Eva 
without notice and was apart from Eva for approximately four or 
five weeks. (T.62) The Defendant's motivation in leaving Eva 
Jefferies involved a relationship with another woman. (T.62). 
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At the time, Don Jefferies left some twelve years prior to 
these precedings, he indicated to Eva that all of the 
properties and possessions of Don and Eva's were to be given to 
Eva and in fact the necessary ownership papers were transferred 
into Eva!s name. (T.64). 
The final time in which Mr. Jefferies left, he again 
reiterated that he did not want a thing and that Eva could have 
it all. (T.64). Mr. Jefferies leaving was unannounced to Eva 
and essentially abandoned Eva with the responsibility of the 
business and for the support of their dependent daughter, Joy. 
(T.64). 
Not only did Don Jefferies fail to announce his leaving 
but he secluded himself purposefully so that Eva Jefferies nor 
his family could get in touch with him. (T.9). 
A few days subsequent to his leaving, the Defendant Don 
Jefferies met Sue Sego who is some 28 years younger than Mr. 
Jefferies. (T.46). Mr. Jefferies and Sue Sego and two of Sue 
Sego's children traveled to Oregon where they have resided 
since that time. 
Not only has Mr. Jefferies indicated that all property 
should be left to Eva Jefferies but Mr. Jefferies has not 
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pursued any means of providing for or assisting Joy with the 
necessities for which she is in need of. 
Mr. Jefferies recognizes that throughout Joy's life she 
has been under the care of a family member and that although 
she has held jobs from time to time, Joy has been unable to 
maintain employment for any period of time and that her 
employment has been sporadic. (T.5). 
In fact, Mr. Jefferies oldest son, Bill, traveled to 
Oregon in order to reach some resolution as to the properties 
acquired during the marriage. When asked if he had said that 
his wife should have all of the properties, Mr. Jefferies 
indicated that he probably did so state/ (T.ll). 
Aside from the pieces of property acquired during the 
marriage, Mr. Jefferies' monthly income consists of $487.00 
social security and approximately $300.00 per month as an 
employee of Personal Property Management. Aside from the social 
security and the monthly payment indicated, the only income Mr. 
Jefferies receives in which he could contribute to support his 
dependent daughter, Joy, is the income received from the seven 
pieces of property obtained during the marriage. (T.41-42). In 
addition, Mr. Jefferies has indicated that he has no desire to 
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attempt to increase his income or tp look to alternative 
sources of livelihood. (T.46). 
One of the parcels of property acquired during the 
marriage was the El Rancho Motel located at 1105 South State 
Street, Provo, Utah. By Warranty Deed dated August 10, 1986, 
the Jefferies sold the motel to William Pfcul Esplin. According 
to the terms of the contract, there is outstanding 
approximately $178,655.00 yet to be paid On said property and 
accordingly payments of $1,385.00 per month are to be paid for 
another 28.9 years. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
paragraph 7.) The trial court awarded the proceeds of said 
contract to Joycelyn Jefferies to provide for her support and 
maintenance. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mr. Jefferies is appealing the decision of the trial court 
claiming that the Court below arbitrarily determined the amount 
of child support to be awarded to Joycelyn Jefferies. The 
Transcript from the proceedings below adequately indicates that 
the necessary factors in determining an appropriate award of 
child support were considered and a reasonable award was 
provided for to assure that Joycelyn Jefferies was taken care 
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of and would not become an award of the state. 
In order to assure that the support payments were provided 
for, the Court properly determined that the proceeds from 
certain property obtained during the marriage should go 
directly to Joycelyn Jefferies for her support. 
ARGUMENT 
The Focus of Mr. Jefferiesf Brief asserts that the trial 
court arbitrarily determined the amount of child support and, 
secondly, that the trial court removed a major asset from the 
marital property for payment of the child support. It should be 
noted initially that Mr. Jefferies does not contend that 
support is needed for his daughter, Joycelyn. 
POINT I 
THE TRANSCRIPT DEMONSTRATES THAT ALL RELEVANT FACTORS 
WERE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND THAT THE DECISION OF 
THE TRIAL JUDGE WILL NOT BE DISTURBED ABSENT A CLEAR 
ERROR OF JUDGMENT. 
Mr. Jefferies correctly cites Utah Code Annotated Section 
78-45-7 as a non-exclusive list of factors in which the 
Legislature has set out as guidelines for the trial court to 
consider in determining the amount of child support to be 
given. The Legislature prefaces the list of factors with the 
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following language: 
The Court in determining the amount of prospective 
support, shall consider all relevant factors 
including but not limited to. . . (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7(2). 
As set out in statute, the trial court is to consider all 
relevant factors in determining the amount, of child support. 
The appropriate standard of review by the Court of Appeals 
in determining whether the trial court decided the amount of 
child support properly is set out by the Supreme Court in 
Bernard vs. Attebury, 629 P.2d 892 at 894, 895 (Utah 1981). 
This Court will not disturb the trial courtfs 
exercise of discretion unless we form a definite and 
firm conviction that the Court below committed a 
clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached 
upon a weighing of the relevant factors. 
Trial judges have been vested with considerable discretion 
in determining the amount of support necessary for individuals 
such as Joycelyn Jefferies. The trial judge is to consider all 
relevant factors in the particular facts and circumstances of 
the case presented to him and from what he considers to be the 
relevant factors, he is to determine an appropriate award of 
money. In light of the broad discretion given to the trial 
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judge, his decision will not be reversed absent a "clear error 
of judgment." See Bernard supra. 
Given that the trial judge has been given such broad 
discretion, there is not a Utah Supreme Court case which 
discusses all of the factors set out in Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-45-7(2). The statute does not dictate the amount of 
weight to be given each of the factors listed and further 
indicates that the list is not exclusive and, therefore, there 
may be other relevant factors which bear equal or greater 
weight than the factors listed. Each Judge in his discretion 
places his own weight of importance on each of the factors. 
The focal point of the judge's concerns are directed 
towards the person in need of support. Consequently, the trial 
judge is concerned primarily with a standard of living in which 
the child or dependent person has become accustomed to living 
and the needs of that child in the future. 
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated with regard to child 
custody and support proceedings: 
In reviewing child custody and support proceedings, 
we accord substantial difference to the trial court's 
findings and give it considerable latitude in 
fashioning the appropriate relief. We will not 
disturb that Court's actions unless the evidence 
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clearly preponderates to the contrary or there has 
been an abuse of discretion. 
Woodward vs. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 at 394 (Utah 1985). 
In short, the fact alone that the Transcripts may not 
indicate explicitly that the trial judge $id not consider every 
factor outlined in 78-45-7 does not establish that the award of 
child support is arbitrary or unjust so long as this Court does 
not find that the ruling by the trial judge was an abuse of 
discretion and that the evidence clearlly preponderates to the 
contrary. 
Even in light of the broad discretion placed with the 
trial judge, a reading of the Transcript establishes that all 
of the factors identified in 78-45-7(2) were in fact before the 
Court and considered. The relative standard of living and the 
relative wealth and income of the parties is well established 
in the Transcript. Plaintiff's exhibits 1 and 2 which were 
offered to the Court outlining the Financial Declarations of 
the parties as well as the summary of real estate and contracts 
owned by the parties to this action. Beginning on page 17, line 
7, of the Transcript counsel for Mrs. Eva Jefferies 
interrogates Mr. Jefferies at length as to his income, physical 
condition, and beginning on page 19, line 19, of the 
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Transcript, Mr. Jefferies presents extensive testimony as to 
the property which was owned of the marriage and his opinion as 
to the values thereof. Further, beginning on page 25, line 6 of 
the Transcript, Mr. Jefferies is questioned about his personal 
property and the value thereof. Beginning on page 28, line 8, 
counsel for Mr. Jefferies further cross-examines him with 
regard to his holdings in property and personal property. 
Beginning on page 64, line 23 of the trial court's 
Transcript, Eva Jefferies is questioned with regard to the 
properties owned of the marriage. 
With respect to Mr. Jefferies1 ability to earn, page 17, 
beginning on line 8 outlines Mr. Jefferies1 income per month 
and his intentions as to future employment. Aside from Mr. 
Jefferies1 monthly employment, the income producing properties 
as well as the assignment of the contract to Mr. Jefferies 
daughter are fully set out in the subsequent pages of the 
Transcript. Joycelyn's ability to earn is fully set out 
beginning on page 59, line 18 in which Mrs. Jefferies indicates 
that Joycelyn is emotionally and academically slow, is unable 
to obtain employment as a result of her condition and, 
consequently, it is necessary for the Court to provide for her 
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support. 
The trial court also considered the need for Joycelyn's 
support in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
paragraphs 6 and 7. 
The respective ages of the parties are set out in the 
Transcript. On page 4, line 17, Mr. Jefferies indicates his age 
as 68. On page 57, line 17 of the Transcript, Eva Jefferies 
indicates that as of the date of the Transcript, she was 68. 
Finally, on page 59, lines 16 and 17 as indicated, JoycelynTs 
age is 37. 
There is no indication in the Transcript that Mr. 
Jefferies is obligated for the support of any other 
individuals. 
Contrary to the assertions of Mr. Jefferies, the Court had 
all of the relevant information before it at the time in which 
it made its determination with regard to the support of the 
Jefferies' daughter, Joycelyn. 
POINT II 
PURSUANT TO THE TRIAL COURTS CONTINUING JURISDICTION 
THE LEGISLATURE HAS PROVIDED FOR FUTURE CONTINGENCIES 
RELATING TO CHILD SUPPORT 
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Implicit in the statute is the mechanism to make 
adjustments and alterations to the award of money based upon a 
substantial change of circumstances. Contrary to the assertion 
of Mr. Jefferies in which he claims that the decision is very 
inflexible and does not make provisions for possible changes in 
the future, the legislature has specifically addressed and 
provided for such contingencies. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7(1) states: 
Prospective support shall be equal to the amount 
granted by prior Court Order unless there has been a 
material change of circumstances on the part of the 
obligor or obligee. 
The Legislature has granted the trial court continuing 
jurisdiction to resolve future contingencies such as those of 
which Mr. Jefferies places concern, i.e. Joycelyn's possible 
improvement or her untimely death. (See page 9 of Mr. 
Jefferies1 Brief.) 
POINT III 
THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE CONTRACT TO JOYCELYN ASSURES 
PAYMENT FOR HER SUPPORT 
The trial court in determining the amount of support 
necessary for Joycelyn's needs concluded that the amount of 
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$1,385.00 per month was necessary to meet her needs. The trial 
court further ordered that the payments receivable on certain 
property owned by Joycelynfs parents would be conveyed to 
Joycelyn to assure that her support payments were made. In 
effect, the assignment of the proceeds is no different than 
requiring Mr. Jefferies to pay to Joycelyn the amount of 
$1,385.00 per month. It is also a well accepted practice for 
the trial court to assign an amount of a parent's wages to 
insure the payment of child support. As set out supra, the 
trial court's primary concern is for the support of the 
dependent person by ordering the assignment of the proceeds, 
the trial court has merely insured the payment of her support. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts both with regard to the 
facts presented before the trial court as outlined in the 
Transcript and the authorities cited, Eva Jefferies 
respectfully requests this Court to affirm the trial court's 
decision in awarding the proceeds from the sale of the property 
to be distributed directly to Joycelyn Jefferies for her 
support. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this °| day of 
1987. 
RICHARD B. JOHNSC 
Attorney for Respondent 
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Every w o m a n shall support her child; and she 
shall support her husband when he is in need. 1957 
78-45-4.1 Duty of stepparent to support stepchild 
- Effect of termination of marriage or common 
law relationship. 
A stepparent shall support a stepchild to the same 
extent that a natural or adoptive parent is required 
to support a child. Provided, however, that upon 
the termination of the marriage or common law 
relationship between the stepparent and the child's 
natural or adoptive parent the support obligation 
shall terminate. two 
78-45-4.2. Natural or adoptive parent has 
primary obligation of support - Right of 
stepparent to recover support. 
Nothing contained herein shall act to relieve the 
natural parent or adoptive parent of the primary 
obligation of support; furthermore, a stepparent has 
the same right to recover support for a stepchild 
from the natural or adoptive parent as any other 
obligee. 1979 
78-45-4.3. Ward of state - Primary obligation to 
support. 
Notwiths tanding section 78-45-2, a natural or 
an adopt ive parent or stepparent whose minor child 
has become a ward of the state is not relieved of the 
pr imary obligation to suppor t that child until he 
reaches the age of majority. 19*3 
78-45-5. Duty of obligor regardless of presence or 
residence of obligee. 
An obligor present or resident in this state has the 
duty of suppor t as defined in this act regardless of 
the presence or residence of the obligee. 1957 
78-45-6. District court jurisdiction. 
The district court shall have jurisdict ion of all 
proceedings brought under this act . 1957 
78-45-7. Determination of amount of support -
Assessment formula for temporary support. 
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the 
a m o u n t granted by prior cour t order unless there 
has been a material change of circumstance on the 
part of the obligor or obligee. 
(2) When no prior court order exists, or a mate-
rial change in circumstances has occurred, the court 
in determining the amount of prospective suppor t , 
shall consider all relevant factors including but not 
limited to : 
(a) the s tandard of living and si tuat ion of the 
part ies; 
(b) the relative wealth and income of the 
parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn ; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the need of the obligee; 
(0 the age of the parties; 
(g) the responsibility of the obligor for the 
support of others. 
(3) W h e n n o prior court order exists, the court 
shall determine and assess all arrearages based u p o n , 
but not limited t o : 
(a) the amount of public assistance received by 
the obligee, if any; 
(b) the funds that have been reasonably and 
necessarily expended in support of spouse and chil-
dren. 
(4) In determining the amount of prospective 
support on an ex parte or other motion for tempo-
rary suoDort, the court shall use a uniform statewide 
can be readily identified &nd shall allow for reaso-
nable deductions from tne obligor's earnings for 
taxes, work related expenses, and living expenses 
The assessment formula shall be established by the 
Department of Social Services and periodically rev-
iewed by the Judicial Council under Subsection 78. 
3-21(3).
 l9u 
78-45-7.1. Medical and dental expenses of 
dependent children - Assigning responsibility for 
payment - Insurance coverage. 
When no prior court order exists or the prior 
court order makes no specific provision for the 
payment of medical and dental expenses for depen-
dent children, the court shall include in its order a 
provision assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expe-
nses for the dependent children. If coverage is ava-
ilable at a reasonable cost, the court may also 
include a provision requiring the purchase and 
maintenance of appropr ia te heal th, hospital , and 
dental care insurance for those children. i*4 
78-45-8. Continuing jurisdiction. 
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or 
vacate the order of support where justice requires. 
1957 
78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support. 
(1) The obligee may enforce his right of support 
against the obligor and the state depar tment of 
social services may proceed pursuant to this act or 
any other applicable statute, either on its own behalf 
or on behalf of the obligee, t o enforce the obligee's 
right of support against the obligor. Whenever any 
court action is commenced by the state department 
of social services to Enforce payment of the 
obl igor 's support obligation, it shall be the duty of 
the at torney general or tpe county a t torney, of the 
county of residence of thfe obligee, to represent that 
depar tment . 
(2) No obligee shall commence any action to 
recover support due or 0wing that obligee whether 
under this act or any other applicable statute 
without first filing an affidavit with the court at the 
time the action is commenced stating whether that 
obligee has received public assistance from any 
source. If the obligee ha$ received public assistance, 
the obligee shall join the department of social serv-
ices as a party plaintiff in the action. The depart-
ment of social services shall be represented as pro-
vided in subsection (1) of tlhis section. \m 
78-45-9.1. Repealed. I*M 
78-45-9.2. County attorney to assist obligee. 
The county a t torney 's office shall provide assist-
ance to an obligee desiring to proceed under this act 
in the following manner : 
(1) Provide forms, approved by the judicial 
council of Utah , for an 6rder of wage assignment if 
the obligee is not represented by legal counsel ; 
(2) The county a t torney 's office may charge a fee 
not to exceed $25 for providing assistance to an 
obligee under subsection (1). 
(3) Inform the obligee of the right t o file impec-
uniously if the obligee is unable t o bear the expenses 
of the action and assist the obligee with such filing; 
(4) Advise the obliged of the available methods 
for service of process; anq 
(5) Assist the obligee in expeditiously scheduling a 
hearing before the court. i*3 
78-45-10. Appeals. 
Anneals mav be taken from orders and judgments 
392 Utah 709 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
1. Criminal Law @=»1216(2) 
Requirement of U.C.A.1953, 76-3-
401(1) that sentences shall run concurrently 
unless court states, in sentence, that they 
shall run consecutively, does not apply to 
sentences imposed by different sovereigns. 
2. Criminal Law <S=>996(1.1) 
Triai court neither modified nor length-
ened sentences it had earlier pronounced, 
and therefore did not exceed jurisdiction by 
stating sentences were to run consecutively 
to those imposed in California, in response 
to defendant's motion to clarify, where 
court had not stated whether they were to 
run concurrently or consecutively in origi-
nal pronouncement. U.C.A.1953, 76-3-
401(1). 
tences consecutive to his California ^ 
tence entitles him to have his s e n t e n c e d 
concurrently with the prior California H 
tence; (2) the trial court exceeded its ^ 
diction by modifying the earlier senten^ 
it had pronounced; and (3) the trial court 
exceeded its jurisdiction when it lengthened 
defendant's earlier sentence. 
Brooke C. Wells, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., J. Ste-
phen Mikita, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
HOWE, Justice: 
Pursuant to a plea bargaining arrange-
ment, defendant pleaded guilty to four 
counts of aggravated robbery and one 
count of second degree murder. He ap-
peals from the trial court's ruling that his 
sentences for these convictions should be 
served consecutively to a sentence he was 
then serving in California. 
Initially, in sentencing defendant, the tri-
al court ordered that the sentences he im-
posed be served consecutively and not con-
currently. However, he did not specify 
whether those sentences were to be served 
concurrently with his California sentence. 
(It is not clear that the court was aware of 
the California term.) After sentencing, de-
fendant filed a motion to clarify whether 
the sentences imposed were to run concur-
rently or consecutively with his California 
sentence. The court thereupon stated that 
the sentences were to be served consecu-
tively to that imposed in California. De-
fendant now claims that the trial court 
erred in three rebpects: (1) the trial court's 
initial failure to make defendant's sen-
Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 76-3-401(1) pro-
vides: "Sentences shall run concurrently 
unless the court states, in the sentence 
that they shall run consecutively." This 
statute speaks only to sentences imposed 
by Utah courts and is silent in its applica-
tion to sentences previously imposed by 
sister states. However, the majority of 
jurisdictions subscribe to the rule that this 
type of statute does not apply to sentence! 
which are imposed by two independent so?-
ereigns and therefore the sentences should 
run consecutively unless the sentencing 
court expressly directs otherwise. State ft 
Smith, Mo.App., 633 S.W.2d 253 (1982); 
Wheeler v. Jernigan, 248 Ga. 302, 282 
S.E.2d 891 (1981); Herman v. Brewer, 
Iowa, 193 N.W.2d 540 (1972); Grimes ft 
Greer, 223 Ga. 628, 157 S.E.2d 260 (1967). 
The rationale behind this rule is that penal 
laws are limited in their application to thi 
penal system of the respective state. 
Grimes r. Greer, supra. 
[1,2] The district court acted properly 
in clarifying defendant's sentence. TM* 
clarification was made at his own request 
The court neither modified nor lengthened 
the sentences it had earlier pronounced, 
but only followed the general rule that 
multiple sentences are construed as consec-
utive when they are imposed by different 
sovereigns. Absent legislative enactment 
to the contrary, we choose to follow that 
rule and not accord extraterritorial effect 
to section 76-3-401(1). 
Affirmed. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, DURHAM 
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
Marvin L. WOODWARD, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
Mildred L. WOODWARD, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 20381. 
Supreme Court of Utah 
Nov 4. 1985. 
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Cite as 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985) 
support, Court would presume trial court's 
findings and order were supported by the 
evidence; moreover, it was apparent from 
limited record that husband had an annual 
income of approximately $30,000, and 
wife's income was only $7,000, and there 
was no evidence to support husband's claim 
that his income was presently inadequate 
to meet children's needs. 
Former husband petitioned for modifi-
cation of divorce decree to require former 
w\U- to pay child support. The First Dis-
trict Court. Box Elder County, Ve Noy 
ChrMoffersen. J., denied the petition, and 
husband appealed. The Supreme Court 
held that iii absence of transcript of the 
finance below and proper citations to the 
rrcord which supported a substantial 
chanp> of circumstance, Court would pre-
fumo that trial court's findings and order 
wrrv supported by the evidence. 
Affirmed 
I. Divorce c=>lf>4 
To obtain modification of divorce de-
«*«\ party seeking modification has bur-
den of showing substantial change of cir-
cumstance since the decree that was not 
ortpmally contemplated within the decree 
lUdf 
*. Divorce e=312.6(l, 4, 5) 
In reviewing child custody and support 
*Urmination in divorce proceedings, Su-
**nie Courts accords substantial defer-
•** to trial court's findings and gives trial 
•own considerable latitude in fashioning 
appropriate relief; Supreme Court will not 
^•turb trial court's actions unless the evi-
n c e clearly preponderates to the contrary 
e h a s been an abuse of discretion. 
1 n £°rce ^309.5(3), 312.6(3) 
Here former husband did not provide 
* K T T C ° U r t W i t h a t ranscript of any 
for m ^ , p n " J u c e d a t hearing on petition 
mo<lif,Cation o f d i v o r c e d e c m i w h i c h 
4. Parent and Child <3=>3.1(1) 
Both parents have an obligation to sup-
port their children, and a child's right to 
that support is paramount; however, it 
does not necessarily follow that in every 
instance the noncustodial parent must pay 
child support to the other parent; trial 
court may fashion such equitable orders in 
relation to the children and their support as 
is reasonable and necessary, considering 
not only needs of the children, but also the 
ability of parent to pay. U.C.A.1953, 78-
45-3, 78-45-4. 
5. Parent and Child <S»3.1(6) 
Fact that non-custodial parent is not 
currently required to pay child support nei-
ther terminates child's right nor obviates 
that parent's responsibility for such sup-
port as may be determined at some future 
time. 
Steven R. Bailey, Ogden, for plaintiff 
and appellant. 
Ben Hadfield, Brigham City, for defend-
ant and respondent. 
PER CURIAM: 
The plaintiff Marvin L. Woodward ap-
peals from the denial of his motion to modi-
fy the parties' divorce decree to require the 
defendant to pay child support. 
The original decree awarded the plaintiff 
father custody of their four children, two 
girls and two boys. Our prior decision is 
reported in Woodward v. Woodward. Utah, 
656 P.2d 431 (1982). Subsequently, the two 
daughters left the plaintiff's home to reside 
with their mother, the defendant. Al-
though both girls are now over age eigh-
--- --•>. u i r u n , c UCCI Cf Will i;!! »- ^.. .„~.«.. ,*,-- — _ - - .. ~ . ~ . -*•, ~ ~ -^- -
to require former wife to pay child teen, one still lives with the defendant and 
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is supported by her. The two younger 
children continue to live in the custody of 
their father in the family home, the use of 
which was awarded to him in the decree. 
The plaintiff claims that because he has 
custody of and supports two children while 
his former spouse has none she should be 
required to provide child support. Accord-
ing to the plaintiff, the trial court erred by 
not enforcing the defendant's mandatory 
obligation to pro\ide financial support for 
the boys in the plaintiffs custody. The 
defendant does not contend that she owes 
no duty of support, but asserts that the 
trial court properly exercised its broad, eq-
uitable discretion in allocating the current 
financial obligations of support to the hus-
band. We agree. 
[1,2] To obtain a modification of the 
divorce decree, the plaintiff has the burden 
to show a substantial change of circum-
stance since the decree that was not origi-
nally contemplated within the decree itself. 
Lea v. Bowers, Utah, 658 P.2d 1213, 1215 
(1983); Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, Utah, 
580 P.2d 1090 (1978). In reviewing child 
custody and support proceedings, we ac-
cord substantial deference to the trial 
court's findings and give it considerable 
latitude in fashioning the appropriate re-
liefs We wITF not disturb that court's ac-
tions unless the evidence clearly preponder-
ates to the contrary or there has been an 
abuse of discretion. Christensen v. Chris-
tensen, Utah, 628 P.2d 1297 (1981); 
McCrary v. MeCrary, Utah, 599 P.2d 1248 
(1979). Because the facts presented to us 
on appeal do not show any abuse of discre-
tion, we affirm the trial court's refusal to 
find any substantial change in the circum-
stance of the parties which would warrant 
the imposition of support payments by the 
defendant. 
[3] The plaintiff has not provided this 
Court with a transcript of any evidence 
produced at the hearing below on his peti-
tion for modification. In the absence of a 
transcript of the evidence below and proper 
citations to the record which support a 
substantial change of circumstance, we 
presume the trial court's findings and or-
der are supported by the evidence. Proud-
fit v. Proud/it, Utah, 598 P.2d 1318 (1979) 
It is apparent from the limited record 
before us that the father has an annual 
income of approximately $32,000, and the 
mother's income is only $7,000. The court 
found that this relative disparity in the 
parties' income has not significantly 
changed since the divorce. Gale v. Gale 
123 Utah 277, 258 P 2d 986 (1953). There 
is no evidence to support the plaintiffi 
claim that his income is now inadequate to 
meet the two children's needs. Further 
more, he continues in the use and posses-
sion of the family home, including the de-
fendant's equity therein. The original de-
cree awarded the plaintiff the custody and 
responsibility for support of all four chil-
dren. Subsequently, because the defend-
ant assumed the support obligation for the 
two girls, the plaintiff has been required to 
only support the two younger children. 
This change of the parties' circumstance* 
was to the plaintiff's advantage and would 
not support the modification the plaintiff 
now seeks. 
[4,5] Both parents have an obligation 
to support their children. A child's right to 
that support is paramount. Hills v. Hill*, 
Utah, 638 P.2d 516 (1981); Uniform Civil 
Liability for Support Act, U.C.A., 1958, 
§§ 78-45-3, -4, as amended. However, it 
does not necessarily follow that in every 
instance the noncustodial parent must pay 
child support to the other parent. The trial 
court may fashion such equitable orders in 
relation to the children and their support •• 
is reasonable and necessary, considerinf 
not only the nerds of the children, but also 
the ability of the parent to pay. Anderson 
v. Anderson, 110 Utah 300, 172 P.2d 182 
(1946); U.C.A., 1953, § 30-3-5, as amend-
ed. The fact that one parent is not current-
ly required to pay support to the other 
neither terminates the child's right nor ob-
viates that parent's responsibility for sue* 
support as may be determined at son* 
future time. In re C.J.U., Utah, 660 VM 
237, 239 (1983). 
Affirmed. No costs awarded. 
SPARTAN AMC/JEEP v 
Cite as 709 P.2d 
SPARTAN AMC/JEEP, Plaintiff, 
v. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF the INDUSTRI-
AL COMMISSION OF UTAH, DE-
PARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SE-
(TRITV and Emery C. Webster, De-
fendants. 
No. 20413. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 4, 1985. 
Discharged employee filed for unem-
ployment benefits. Employer sought re-
vie* of decision of Board of Review of 
Industrial Commission which affirmed rul-
ing by administrative law judge that em-
pkn«c had not been discharged for just 
cmus<» and thus was eligible for unemploy-
ment compensation. The Supreme Court, 
Heme, .1, held that competent evidence sup-
ported decision. 
Affirmed. 
Social Security and Public Welfare 
«=»584.5 
Decision of Board of ^Review that em-
ployee was discharged without just cause 
w»d thus was eligible for unemployment 
totnpensation was supported by employee's 
competent testimony that he had never tak-
•n incentives from parts suppliers contrary 
to company policy and that he had not 
**fcen supplies from the company, despite 
rwults of polygraph test, evidenced only by 
fetter detailing examiner's conclusions, in-
dicating possibility that employee had ac-
«*pted kickbacks and had stolen goods 
'*>m employer. U.C.A.1953, 35-4-5(b)(l). 
Donald E. Elkins, Provo, for appellant. 
K. Allan Zabel, Salt Lake City, for re-
•Pondents. 
"OWE, Justice: 
APPellant, Spartan AMC/Jeep, seeks re-
*** of a decision of the Board of Review 
. BD. OF REVIEW, ETC. Utah 3 9 5 
395 (Utah 198S) 
of the Industrial Commission which af-
firmed an administrative law judge's ruling 
that claimant, Webster, had not been dis-
charged for just cause and thus was eligi-
ble for unemployment compensation. Ap-
pellant contends that the evidence is insuf-
ficient to sustain the Board of Review. 
Because some cash had been stolen from 
the parts department at Spartan 
AMC/Jeep, the company president, Nor-
man Garrett, asked the parts department 
employees to undergo polygraph tests. 
Claimant voluntarily took the test. As a 
result of the test, the polygraph examiner 
told Garrett that claimant had possibly tak-
en kickbacks from parts suppliers, in viola-
tion of company policy, and had stolen 
goods from the company. The president 
confronted claimant, who admitted taking 
some antifreeze for use in his own automo-
bile and some motor home cabinet doors 
which he had been instructed to discard. 
He denied taking money or gifts from 
parts suppliers, in violation of company pol-
icy. Despite these denials, Garrett con-
cluded that claimant was dishonest and dis-
missed him. 
Claimant filed for unemployment bene-
fits, and Spartan challenged any award to 
him. After a hearing, at which conflicting 
testimony was presented, the administra-
tive law judge held that Spartan had failed 
to carry its burden that claimant had been 
discharged for conduct which would dis-
qualify him for unemployment compensa-
tion. U.C.A., 1953, § 35-4-5(bXD. This 
ruling was upheld by the Board of Review. 
Our standard of review in cases from the 
Board of Review is established by statute. 
"[T]he findings of . . . the board of review 
as to the facts if supported by evidence, 
shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of 
the court shall be confined to questions of 
law." U.C.A., 1953, § 35-4-10(i). We view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the findings and, if there is evidence of any 
substance whatever which can be reason-
ably regarded as supporting the determina-
tion of the Board of Review, we will affirm 
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Frances E. BERNARD, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
John W. ATTEBURY, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 16985. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 9, 1981. 
Father appealed from that portion of 
consolidated order of the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Raymond S. Uno, 
J. Pro Tern, which required him to pay 
$2,600 to mother for child support and ar-
rearages in support payments. The Su-
preme Court, Maughan, C. J., held that: (1) 
trial court's decision to award one child 
prospective support did not constitute a 
clear error of judgment; (2) there was sub-
stantial evidence to support trial court's 
finding that one child was not emancipated 
from parental custody; and (3) doctrine of 
res judicata could not be invoked by father 
to foreclose consideration of mother's claim 
for past-due child support payments. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, J., concurred in the result. 
1. Divorce <3=>2 
The Supreme Court must apply the 
laws of Utah in determining the appropri-
ateness of imposing a duty of child support. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-61a-7. 
2. Parent and Child <s=*3.3(8) 
While child support payments become 
unalterable debts as they accrue and a peri-
odic installment cannot be changed or modi-
fied after installment has become due, trial 
court may exercise its discretion in impos-
ing a duty of support prospectively. U.C.A. 
1953, 77-£la-24. 
3. Parent and Child <s=> 3.3(10) 
The Supreme Court will not disturb 
trial court's exercise of discretion in deter-
mining appropriateness of imposing child 
support duty unless Supreme Court forms 
definite and firm conviction that court be-
low committed clear error of judgment in 
conclusion it reached upon weighing of rele-
vant factors. U.C.A.1953, 77-61a-7. 
4. Parent and Child <s=»3.3(8) 
Decision of trial court to award one 
child prospective support, reached after 
weighing of information concerning where-
abouts and living situation of child, did not 
constitute a clear error of judgment. U.C. 
A.1953, 77-61a-7. 
5. Parent and Child <s=»3.3(5) 
Substantial evidence supported trial 
court's decision that one child was not 
emancipated from parental custody for pur-
poses of determining child support. U.C.A. 
1953, 77-61a-7. 
6. Judgment <s=>634 
The doctrine of res judicata renders a 
final judgment, on the merits, by a court of 
competent jurisdiction, conclusive upon par-
ties and is a bar to subsequent litigation of 
same issues. 
7. Judgment <s=»650 
Before doctrine of res judicata is appli-
cable, final judgment embracing all issues 
must be entered and preliminary or interim 
rulings which do not represent final deter-
mination do not rise to dignity of res judica-
ta. 
8. Judgment e=>658 
Where previous court child sup;*>rt or-
der did not adjudicate claim of relief relate 
ing to one of the parties' children and mere-
ly ordered temporary child support for the 
parties' other minor child pending further 
order of court, court's decree did not fulfill 
requirements of rule governing judgment in 
case involving multiple claims for relief and 
did not constitute a final judgment; there-
fore, the doctrine of res judicata could not 
be invoked by the father to foreclose consid-
eration of the mother's claim for past-due 
payments at subsequent hearings. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b). 
Wendell P. Abies, Salt Lake City, fa-
defendant and appellant. 
BERNARD v. 
Cite as, Utah, 
Sandra N. Peuler, Deputy Salt Lake 
County Atty., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
and respondent. 
MAUGHAN, Chief Justice: 
The defendant appeals from that portion 
of the district court's consolidated order 
which requires him to pay $2,600 to the 
plaintiff for child support and arrearages in 
his support payments. We affirm the dis-
trict court's order. All statutory references 
arc to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. 
On September 7, 1976, the district court 
of Sweetwater County, Wyoming, issued a 
divorce decree terminating the marriage of 
the plaintiff and defendant, John W. Atte-
bury Pursuant to this decree, the plaintiff 
was awarded custody of the couple's two 
minor children, John David and John Jo-
seph, and the defendant agreed to pay $250 
l>er child per month for support of those 
children. 
Following the divorce, the children lived 
with the plaintiff until October, 1977, when 
John Joseph came to Salt Lake City to live 
with the defendant. In March, 1978, John 
David joined his brother, and the defend-
ant, in Salt Lake City. Thereafter, the 
children lived with the defendant in Utah 
until December, 1978, when the plaintiff 
resumed custody of them in Salt Lake City. 
On December 9, 1978, John David and John 
Joseph returned to Green River, Wyoming, 
where they lived with friends until their 
mother joined them there on January 1, 
1979. The plaintiff and the two children 
have lived together continually in Green 
River from that time until the date of the 
original hearing in this enforcement pro-
ceeding. 
The plaintiff initiated the present pro-
ceedings on March 21, 1979, when she filed 
a petition for support under the Uniform 
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 
77 61a-1 et seq., requesting enforcement of 
the Wyoming support decree. Prior to the 
initial hearing in the matter which was held 
on May 30, 1979, the parties entered into an 
agreement stipulating to a reduction in the 
required support money from $500 per 
ATTEBURY Utah 8 9 3 
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month to $300, with monthly payments of 
$150 for the support of John Joseph to start 
immediately. However, because of factual 
questions concerning the possible emancipa-
tion of John David from the custody of the 
plaintiff, the agreement reserved payment 
of support for John David until that issue 
could be investigated. 
This agreement was to be incorporated 
into the court's original order following the 
May 30th hearing. However, the original 
rendition of the agreement as laid out in 
the court's order was incorrect and was 
later amended by stipulation A corrected 
order was subsequently adopted by the dis-
trict court on June 8, 1979. In both the 
original and amended order, the defendant 
was "temporarily ordered to pay the sum of 
$150 for one child . . . for the support of 
John Joseph, beginning with June, 1979. 
Said payments shall continue each and ev-
ery month thereafter until further order of 
this court." The amendment to the order 
concerned the scope of an investigation to 
be undertaken by the Green River County 
Attorney's office for factual data relating 
to the possible emancipation of John David. 
Following a hearing on August 22, 1979, 
the district court entered a judgment and 
decree on September 5, 1979, which ordered 
the defendant to pay $150 a month for the 
support of John David for the months of 
August, September, October and November, 
1979, and thereafter cease making such 
payments because of the child's eighteenth 
birthday. This decree further ordered the 
continuation of the payments to John Jo-
seph and entered a judgment of $2,000, 
representing past due child support. After 
this hearing, a motion was submitted by the 
defendant requesting the order be amended 
to identify the portions of the $2,000 judg-
ment which were attributable to each par-
ticular child. 
At the August hearing, the defendant 
argued the judgment entered in the prior 
hearing was res judicata regarding his lia-
bility for past support payments and pre-
cluded a new judgment granting arrearag-
es. The court expressly refused to rule on 
this issue but advised the defendant he 
could present it at future proceedings. 
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Following a hearing on the defendant's 
motion to amend the order of September 5, 
1979, the court denied the defendant's mo-
tion to set aside that judgment. 
Finally, another hearing was held and a 
consolidated judgment entered on February 
22, 1980, merging all previous orders and 
judgments. This consolidated order de-
creed that the defendant pay $150 per 
month to John Joseph, commencing on June 
1, 1979. The decree also ordered the de-
fendant to pay a total amount of $600 for 
the support of John David from August 1, 
1979 through November 30, 1979. The or-
der upheld the previous judgment granting 
the plaintiff $2,000 in arrearages divided 
equally between the children which repre-
sented unfulfilled payments due and owing 
from February through May of 1979. The 
order waived support payments for John 
David for the months of June and July of 
1979 because of his employment during 
those months and arranged for payment of 
the $2,600 by installments which would run 
concurrently with the support payments for 
John Joseph. 
The district court's consolidated order 
went on the declare: 
" . . . [tjhat the defense of res judicata, 
specifically that the order of May 31, fsic] 
(30), 1979, was res judicata as to the 
arrearages awarded in the Judgment and 
Order of September 5, 1979, be and the 
same is hereby determined to be not es-
tablished." 
The defendant's principal contentions on 
appeal are: (1) the trial court abused its 
discretion in ordering support for John 
David; (2) John David is not entitled to 
support because he was emancipated from 
his mother's custody during the time in 
question; and (3) the order of May 30, 1979, 
is res judicata and forecloses the considera-
tion of past due support payments at subse-
quent hearings. 
1. See Lamberth v. Lamberth, Utah, 550 P.2d 
200 (1976). 
2. Larsen v. Larsen, Utah, 56! P.2d 1077, 1079 (1977). 
[1,2] Turning to the first contention, 
we are reminded of the fact that pursuant 
to 77-61a-7, this court must apply the laws 
of Utah in determining the appropriateness 
of imposing a duty of support.1 Thus, while 
support payments become unalterable debts 
as they accrue and a periodic installment 
cannot be changed or modified after the 
installment has become due,2 the trial court 
may exercise its discretion in imposing a 
duty of support prospectively.3 
In determining the appropriateness of im-
posing a support duty, 78-45-7 outlines a 
number of relevant factors which the court 
must consider in exercising its discretion. 
Specifically, 78-45-7 provides: 
"(1) Prospective support shall be equal 
to the amount granted by the prior court 
order unless there has been a material 
change of circumstances on the part of 
the obligor or obligee. 
"(2) When no prior court order exists, 
or a material change in circumstances has 
occurred, the court in determining the 
amount of prospective support shall con-
sider all relevant factors including, but 
not limited to: 
"(a) the standard of living and situa-
tion of the parties; 
"(b) the relative wealth and income 
of the parties; 
"(c) the ability of the obligor to 
earn; 
"(d) the ability of the obligee to 
earn; 
"(e) the need of the obligee; 
"(f) the age of the parties; 
"(g) the responsibility of the obligor 
for the support of others." 
[3] This Court will not disturb the trial 
court's exercise of discretion unless we form 
a definite and firm conviction that the 
court below committed a clear error of 
judgment in the conclusion it reached upon 
3. See77-61a-24. ["If the court of the respond-
ing state finds a duty of support, it may order 
the respondent to furnish support or reirn-
bursement therefor . . . " (emphasis added)!; 
see also Carter v. Carter, 19 Utah 2d 183, 429 
P.2d 35 (1967). 
BERNARD v 
Cite as, Utah, 
a weighing of the relevant factors.4 There-
fore, if the decision were on a consideration 
of the relevant factors and not based upon 
irrelevant or inappropriate considerations, 
this Court will not reverse the trial court's 
determination unless we are convinced that 
the decision amounted to a clear error of 
judgment. 
[4] In the present case, the proceedings 
were continued several times so that infor-
mation concerning the whereabouts and liv-
ing situation of John David could be as-
certained. It appears from the record the 
trial court considered the information which 
was uncovered from these investigations 
and other relevant factors in making its 
decision to award John David prospective 
support. Because the decision reached af-
ter a weighing of these factors does not 
constitute a clear error of judgment we will 
not disturb the district court's decision con-
cerning John David's right to support. 
[5] Similarly, the trial court's determi-
nation that John David was not emancipat-
ed from parental custody will not be dis-
turbed on appeal. There was substantial 
evidence presented at trial to support the 
trial court's decision concerning the emanci-
pation issue and this Court will generally 
not disturb the findings of the trial court 
when those findings are supported by sub-
stantial, credible evidence.5 
[6,7] The next contention advanced by 
the defendant is that the judgment and 
order which was entered by the court fol-
lowing the May 30, 1979, hearing is res 
4. See Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522 
(9th Cir. 1976); see also Ute-Cal Land Develop-
ment Corp. v. Sather, Utah, 605 P.2d 1240 
(1980); Terry- v. Zions Cooperative Mercantile 
Institution, Utah, 605 P.2d 314 (1979). 
5. Hopkins v. Wardley Corp., Utah, 611 P.2d 
1204 (1980); R. C. Tolman Construction Com-
pany, Inc v. Myton Water Association, Utah, 
563 P.2d 780 (1977); Town and Country Dis-
posal, Inc. v. Martin, Utah, 563 P.2d 195 (1977). 
6- Olsen v. Board of Education of the Granite 
School District, Utah, 571 P.2d 1336. 1338 
(1977). 
7. See Richardson v. Grand Central Corpora-
tion, Utah. 572 P.2d 395, 397 (1977); In re 
Town of West Jordan, 7 Utah 2d 391. 326 P.2d 
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judicata and precludes any further assess-
ment of past due support payments. In 
this jurisdiction, the doctrine of res judicata 
renders a final judgment, on the merits, by 
a court of competent jurisdiction, conclusive 
upon the parties and is a bar to subsequent 
litigation of the same issues.6 Before the 
doctrine is applicable, however, a final 
judgment embracing all the issues must be 
entered and preliminary or interim rulings 
which do not represent a final determina-
tion do not rise to the dignity of res judica-
ta.7 
In deciding whether the court's order of 
May 30 constitutes a final judgment and as 
such invokes the doctrine of res judicata we 
are guided by Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which states: 
"When more than one claim for relief is 
presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third 
party claim, and/or when multiple parties 
are involved, the court may direct the 
entry of a final judgment as to one or 
more but fewer than all of the claims or 
parties only upon an express determina-
tion by the court that there is no just 
reason for delay and upon an express 
direction for the entry of judgment. In 
the absence of such determination and 
direction, any order or other form of deci-
sion, however designated, which adjudi-
cates fewer than all the claims or the 
rights and liabilities of fewer than all of 
the parties shall not terminate the action 
as to any of the claims or parties, and the 
105 (1958); see also C & H Construction & 
Paving Co. v. Citizens Bank, 93 N.M. 150, 597 
P.2d 1190 (1979); McAllister v. Charter First 
Mortgage, Inc., 279 Or 279, 567 P 2d 539. 542 
(1977) ["Before res judicata applies, the prior 
lawsuit must have ended in an 'adjudication of 
issues which have culminated in a final de-
cree.' " Quoting from Huszar v. Certified Real-
ty Co., 272 Or. 517, 538 P.2d 57, 60 (1975)]; 
American Bank of Oklahoma v. Adams, Okl., 
514 P.2d 1191 (1973); LUISI Truck Lines, Inc. v. 
Washington Utilities and Transportation 
Comm., 72 Wash.2d 887, 435 P.2d 654 (1967); 
State ex rel. Adult and Family Services Divi-
sion v. Copeland, 45 Or.App. 35, 607 P.2d 222 
(1980). 
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order or other form of decision is subject 
to revision at any time before the entry 
of judgment adjudicating all the claims 
and the rights and liabilities of all the 
parties." 
[8] Because the May 30 order did not 
adjudicate the claim of relief relating to 
John David and merely ordered temporary 
support for the couple's other minor child 
pending "further order of this court," the 
court's decree does not fulfill the require-
ments of Rule 54(b) and does not constitute 
a final judgment. Therefore, the doctrine 
of res judicata cannot be invoked by the 
defendant to foreclose consideration of the 
plaintiff's claim for past due payments at 
the subsequent hearings.8 
The other issues advanced by the defend-
ant on appeal are equally without merit and 
the district court's consolidated order is, 
therefore, affirmed. 
HALL, HOWE and OAKS, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
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Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 22, 1981. 
Former pretrial detainee appealed from 
order of the Second District Court, Weber 
8. Cf. Oldroyd v. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 P. 
580, 588 (1925); State v. Booth, 21 Utah 88, 59 
P. 553 (1899); In Booth we explained; " 
where the rights of the parties in an action, or a 
distinct and independent branch thereof, are 
determined by the court, and nothing is re-
served for future determination, except what 
County, John F. Wahlquist, J., granting 
partial relief in response to former detain-
ee's petition for writ of habeas corpus at-
tacking conditions of confinement at jaiL 
The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: 
(1) former pretrial detainee had standing to 
sue, even though he had moved beyond 
pretrial stage; (2) inadequate space and 
other conditions inimical to maintenance of 
health of detainees raised issues of constitu-
tional dimensions concerning conditions of 
incarceration; (3) confinement of pretrial 
detainees in overcrowded area described as 
maximum security cells of county jail raised 
serious constitutional issues as to detainee's 
right of due process to be free from unduly 
harsh and rigorous treatment; (4) failure to 
provide reasonable opportunity for exercise 
also imposed harsh conditions of confine-
ment; and (5) procedures ordered by trial 
court would be continued and additional 
procedures ordered to be adopted, if at all 
practicable. 
Remanded. 
1. Habeas Corpus <s=»9 
Although former detainee had moved 
beyond pretrial stage, where it was not 
possible to adjudicate legality of conditions 
complained of during period of pretrial de-
tention, conditions at county jail giving rise 
to constitutional issues remained, and there 
was strong public interest in having legality 
of conditions settled, former pretrial detain-
ee had standing to sue to challenge condi-
tions of confinement at jail. U.S.C.A. 
Const. Amend. 8. 
2. Action <8=»6, 13 
The law does not provide exemption 
from judicial scrutiny to unlawful acts 
which are likely to be repeated on ground 
that they do not fall within usual principles 
of standing and justiciability. 
may be necessary to enforce the judgment or 
decision, the judgment is final." Id., 59 P. at 
554. For a comprehensive review of early case 
law on the question of what constitutes a final 
judgment see Shurtz v. Thorley, 90 Utah 381, 
61 P.2d 1262 (1936) 
WICKHAM 
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3. Action o=»6 
Generally, actual controversy must ex-
ist at stage of appellate review, but excep-
tion to such rule allows technically mooted 
controversy to be adjudicated in certain cir-
cumstances. 
4. Habeas Corpus <£=»25 
To accomplish end of serving constitu-
tional safeguards of human life and liberty, 
it is sufficient to invoke writ of habeas 
corpus as remedy for attacking condition of 
confinement that remedy be directed to-
ward abolishing unlawful condition of con-
finement, as opposed to release of prisoner. 
5. Prisons e=>17 
Inadequate space and other conditions 
of confinement inimical to maintenance of 
health of pretrial detainees raised issues of 
constitutional dimensions concerning condi-
tions of incarceration. U.S.C.A.Const. 
Amends. 8, 14. 
6. Prisons <3=>4(3) 
Problems concerning or arising out of 
internal prison administration will be ad-
dressed by courts only with reluctance and 
upon showing of violations of important 
rights. 
7. Constitutional Law <s=> 272(2) 
Criminal Law <s=»1213 
Prisons and jails are not required to 
provide comforts and amenities available to 
one on outside world, but neither is incar-
ceration a justification for dissolving pro-
tection of Eighth Amendment which pre-
vents inhuman treatment of prisoners, or 
due process clauses of State and Federal 
Constitutions which prevent punishment of 
detainee prior to adjudication of guilt. U.S. 
C.A.Const. Amends. 8, 14; Const. Art. 1, 
§7. 
8. Prisons <s=>13(2) 
Detainees do not possess full rights of 
personal liberty enjoyed by persons not 
charged with a crime, but conditions of 
confinement are not without some constitu-
tional limitations and are limited to meas-
ures necessary to assure their appearance 
for trial and to maintain jail discipline and 
security. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14; 
Const. Art. 1, § 7. 
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9. Habeas Corpus <&=>25 
Confinement of pretrial detainees in 
overcrowded area described as maximum 
security cells of county jail raised serious 
constitutional issues as to detainee's due 
process right to be free from unduly harsh 
and rigorous treatment. U.S.C.A.Const. 
Amend. 14; Const. Art. 1, § 7. 
10. Constitutional Law <s=>272(2) 
County jail's failure to provide reasona-
ble opportunity for exercise imposed harsh 
conditions of confinement violative of de-
tainee's due process right to be free from 
unduly harsh and rigorous treatment. U.S. 
C.A.Const. Amend. 14; Const. Art. 1, § 7. 
James R. Hasenyagen, Ogden, for plain-
tiff and appellant. 
David L. Wilkinson, Craig L. Barlow, Salt 
Lake City, Robert Newey, Ogden, for de-
fendant and respondent. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Petitioner Mark Wickham was a pretrial 
detainee at the Weber County jail at the 
time this case was at issue in the trial court. 
He attacked the conditions of confinement 
at the jail as being in violation of the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the cruel and unusual punishment 
prohibition of the Eighth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. The Dis-
trict Court for Weber County granted par-
tial relief in response to Wickham's petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus, and he appeals. 
Wickham contends that the relief granted 
by the district court is insufficient and re-
quests this Court to order that "the place 
and conditions for confinement of pretrial 
detainees in the Weber County Jail facility 
be brought into alignment with constitu-
tionally mandated minimum standards 
On October 26, 1978, eight pretrial de-
tainees incarcerated on the twelfth floor of 
the Weber County jail filed a pro se petition 
for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the 
conditions and place of their confinement. 
The district court appointed counsel to rep-
